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Assessing Systemic Risk of the European Insurance Industry 
Elia Berdin29, Matteo Sottocornola30 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the systemic relevance of the insurance industry. We do it by 
analysing the systemic contribution of the insurance industry vis-á-vis other industries 
by applying three measures, namely the linear Granger causality test, conditional 
value at risk and marginal expected shortfall, to three groups, namely banks, insurers 
and non-financial companies listed in Europe over the last 14 years. Our evidence 
suggests that the insurance industry shows i) a persistent systemic relevance over 
time, ii) it plays a subordinate role in causing systemic risk compared to banks. In 
addition, iii) we do not find clear evidence on the higher systemic relevance of SIFI 
insurers compared to non-SIFIs. 
 
The content of this study does not reflect the opinion of EIOPA. Responsibility for the 
information and the views expressed therein lies entirely with the authors. 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the 2007-2009 financial crises and the 2010-2012 European sovereign debt 
crises, the interest around systemic risk has become increasingly relevant.31 After the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in particular, the debate on systemic risk has been 
primarily focused on banks. However, recent empirical evidence suggests that 
institutions not traditionally associated with systemic risk, such as insurance 
companies, also play a prominent role in posing it. In particular, some authors find 
that the insurance industry has become a non-negligible source of systemic risk (e.g. 
Billio et al. (2012) and Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014)). This is partially in contrast to 
other authors, who do not find evidence of systemic relevance for the industry as a 
whole (e.g. Harrington (2009), Bell and Keller (2009) and the Geneva Association 
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(2010)). Finally, other authors take a more granular perspective and argue that 
insurance companies might be systemically relevant, but that such risk stems from 
non-traditional (banking-related) activities (Baluch et al. (2011) and Cummins and 
Weiss (2014)) and that in general, the systemic relevance of the insurance industry as 
a whole is still subordinated with respect to the banking industry (Chen et al. (2013)). 
As the current literature does not provide a common understanding and clear 
evidence regarding the systemic relevance of the insurance industry, we aim with this 
paper to fill this gap by empirically investigating its systemic relevance vis-á-vis other 
industries. 
To do so, we test three equity return-based measures of systemic risk, namely 1) the 
indexes based on linear Granger causality tests proposed by Billio et al. (2012) 
(Granger test), 2) the Conditional Value at Risk proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) (CoVaR) and 3) the Dynamic Marginal Expected Shortfall proposed by 
Brownlees and Engle (2012) (DMES), on 3 groups: banks, insurers and non-financial 
companies, all listed in Europe. We test the systemic relevance of each institution with 
respect to the total system intended as the sum of the companies included in the 3 
groups. Based on these estimations, we rank financial institutions according to their 
average systemic risk contribution over time and create an industry composition 
index. 
Our evidence suggests that the insurance industry tends i) to persistently pose 
systemic risk over time and ii) to play a subordinate role with respect to the banking 
industry with some distinction in specific periods when the insurance industry 
becomes more systemic than the banking industry.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a comprehensive literature 
review, section 3 describes the methodology, section 4 the data; section 5 describes 
the results and section 6 concludes the analysis. 
2. Literature review 
The literature on systemic risk has been steadily growing following the crises. In 
particular, a wide range of new methodologies for testing the systemic contribution of 
financial institutions has been proposed. Moreover, both academia and regulators 
have dedicated more attention to the role of non-banking financial institutions: among 
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these institutions, insurance companies emerged as a potential source of systemic 
risk.32 
Before the crisis, there was substantial agreement among scholars in considering the 
insurance industry to be not systemically relevant. However, in the literature that 
emerged in the aftermath of the crisis, although many studies still consider the 
insurance industry non-systemically relevant as a whole, a clear-cut indication does 
not emerge anymore. 
As a matter of fact, looking at the evidences stemming from market based data that 
rely on the assumption that prices reflect all the necessary information33, substantial 
differences in the evaluation of the insurance industry emerge. For instance, Acharya 
et al. (2010) argue that insurance companies are overall the least systemically 
relevant financial institutions. The authors provide estimations of the spillover effects 
through a measure of conditional capital shortfall, i.e. Systemic Expected Shortfall 
(SES) and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) for the US financial industry during the 
2007-2009 crises. The contribution of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) extends the 
traditional value at risk concept to the entire financial system conditional on 
institutions being in distress (ΔCoVaR). The authors apply the measure to a set of 
institutions, including banks and thrifts, investment banks, government sponsored 
enterprises and insurance companies and find no distinction between the systemic 
relevance of different types of institutions. By contrast, Billio et al. (2012) apply the 
linear and non-linear Granger causality test to a sample of banks, insurers, hedge 
funds and broker dealers operating in the U.S. in order to establish pairwise Granger 
causality among equity returns of financial institutions. Their evidence suggests that 
during the 2008 financial crisis, besides banks, insurance companies were a major 
source of systemic risk. This conclusion is partially in contrast to Chen et al. (2013): 
the authors agree that the linear Granger causality test attributes to insurance 
companies a systemic relevance comparable with the systemic relevance of banks. 
However, they argue that when applying a linear and non-linear Granger causality test 
to the same series corrected for heteroscedasticity, banks tend to cause more 
systemic risk and for longer periods of time then insurance companies.  
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Both theoretical and empirical research that take into consideration fundamentals of 
the insurance industry provide ambiguous indications about the systemic relevance of 
insurers. Even though the common understanding classifies the insurance industry as 
not systemically relevant, distinctions mainly driven by the engagement in specific 
business lines emerge. 
The Geneva Association (2010) conducts an analysis on the role played by insurers 
during the 2008 crisis and argues that the substantial differences between banks and 
insurance companies, namely the long-term liability structure of insurers compared to 
banks and the strong cash flow granted by the inversion of the cycle, is sufficient to 
rule out any systemically implications of the insurance industry during the financial 
crises aside from the companies highly exposed towards non-core insurance activities. 
The higher systemic relevance of non-traditional versus traditional insurance activities 
is analysed by other authors such as Bell and Keller (2009) who investigate the 
relevant risk factors stemming from an insurance company, or Cummins and Weiss 
(2014) who analyse primary indicators and contributing factors. More specifically, 
Cummins and Weiss (2014) add a further distinction to the dichotomy between 
traditional and non-traditional activities, namely the higher systemic relevance of 
traditional life compared to the P&C business: this is mainly driven by the higher 
leverage, interconnectedness and exposure to credit, market and liquidity risk. Similar 
conclusions are reached by Baluch et al. (2011), who find that the fundamental 
reason behind the systemic relevance of the bank-like business type is due to the 
massive amount of interconnectedness, and by Harrington (2009) who concludes that 
systemic risk is potentially higher for life insurers due to the higher leverage, 
sensitivity to asset value decline and potential policyholder withdrawals during a 
financial crisis.  
An additional strand of research based both on market and accounting data tend to 
confirm the difficulties in defining the insurance industry as systemically relevant. 
Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014) estimate the systemic risk contribution based on CoVaR 
and MES for a sample of US Insurers during the 2007-2008 crisis, inferring that 
insurers that were most exposed to systemic risk were on average larger, relied more 
heavily on non-policy holder liabilities and had higher ratios of investment income to 
net revenues. Weiss et al. (2014) analyse a much broader sample of insurers over a 
longer time horizon and find that the systemic risk contribution of the insurance sector 
is relatively small. However, they also argue that the contribution of insurers to 
systemic risk peaked during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and find that the 
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interconnectedness of large insurers with the insurance industry is a significant driver 
of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. Finally, they argue that the contribution of 
insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by leverage, loss ratios and 
funding fragility. 
It is also worth noting that an ambiguous position is attributed to reinsurance 
companies: studies by Swiss Re (2003) and by The Group of Thirty (2006) exclude 
any systemic relevance for the reinsurance business. However Cummins and Weiss 
(2014) claim that, despite historical evidence, both life and P&C insurers are indeed 
exposed to reinsurance crises. In conclusion, the existing literature provides a 
diversified and controversial picture of the systemic relevance of the insurance 
industry. On the one hand, some studies argue that due to its nature, the insurance 
industry does not pose systemic risk; on the other hand, some studies provide 
evidence on the role of the insurance industry in posing systemic risk and its growing 
importance in recent years, particularly driven by the engagement of insurers in non-
traditional activities. Moreover the position of reinsurers appears unclear. 
This paper, shed further light on the systemic relevance of the European insurance 
industry compared to other industries, namely banks and non-financial institution. 
Moreover, we aim at assessing the contribution to the riskiness of the whole system of 
the systemically important vis-á-vis non-systemically important insurance companies. 
3. Methodology 
In order to compare the systemic relevance of the insurance industry with the 
systemic relevance of other industries we define three groups, namely banks, insurers 
and non-financials and apply to them three widely used equity-based measures of 
systemic risk: 1) the Granger causality test proposed by Billio et al. (2012), 2) the 
ΔCoVaR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and 3) the DMES proposed by 
Brownlees and Engle (2012).34 
The literature proposes several equity-based models to assess the systemic relevance 
of institutions, anyhow no consensus among academia has been found on the best 
approach. We thus opted for the mentioned three due to i) their diffusion (many 
central banks and regulators apply these models), ii) their robustness (the models 
have been thoroughly discussed and challenged both in academia and industry, and 
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finally iii) our willing to approach the measurement of the systemic relevance of an 
industry by different perspectives. 
The three systemic risk measures tend to capture different phenomena and therefore 
need to be correctly interpreted. The Granger causality test is a measure that allows 
us to quantify the degree of connectedness of an institution vis-á-vis a system of 
institutions. By creating a network of pairwise statistical relations, we do not only 
observe the amount of interdependence, but also the direction thereof. The measure 
is thus a good proxy for an analysis at an aggregate level (for example industry or 
other clusters), but its estimation could become cumbersome when the objective is to 
test the individual interconnection with respect to a system of institutions as proxy for 
the market.35  
The ΔCoVaR measures the difference between the CoVaR conditional on the distress 
of an institution, i.e. the value-at-risk of the system conditional on an institution being 
in distress, and the CoVaR conditional on the normal state of the institution. It is 
therefore able to capture the marginal contribution of a particular institution to the 
overall systemic risk. Finally, the DMES measures, in a dynamic setting, the expected 
drop in equity value of an institution when the system is in distress. It is worth 
mentioning that this is not a direct measure of systemic risk, but is highly related to 
it. The contribution of Brownlees and Engle (2012) originates from the proposal of 
Acharya et al. (2010), in which the marginal expected shortfall of an institution is 
coupled with its leverage to originate the Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES). SES 
measures the expected capital shortage of an individual firm conditional on a 
substantial reduction in the capitalization of the system. Brownlees and Engle propose 
a similar measure called SRISK, which is based on a dynamic estimation of the 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and leverage ratios. A major advantage of such a 
contribution is its ability to capture time-varying effects, effects which are not 
observable in the framework of Acharya et al. (2010). However, both measures rely 
on the estimation of the MES and of pre-determined leverage ratios: in order to avoid 
additional assumptions that might cast doubts on the reliability of the estimation 
within the insurance industry,36 we simply rely on the directly observable part of the 
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measure, i.e. the DMES, which is sufficient to provide information on the individual 
fragility of the individual institution with respect to market tail events, which in turn 
have potential systemic implications.37 
In addition, for each systemic risk measure and for each group, we compute the 
average contribution of the individual institution towards the total system composed 
by the three groups.38 We then calculate the average contribution of each industry by 
taking the median of the month (for the ΔCoVaR and the DMES, whereas the Granger 
causality test is calculated on a monthly basis) and the average through the 
institutions of the same industry.39 
Finally, at each point in time, we rank the institutions systemic relevance with respect 
to the total system from the most to the least systemically relevant according to each 
measure. We then select the top ten institutions at each point in time and calculate 
the relative weight of each industry within the top ten over time, thereby creating 
three indexes. Finally, we group all three indexes and form the Industry Composition 
Index displaying in percentage the top ranked institutions by industry. 
4. Data 
The data set for the industry analysis consists of equity returns of 60 companies listed 
in Europe over a time window of 14 years, from January 1999 to December 2013, 
which is 17 years (i.e. from January 1996 to December 2013) for the Granger 
causality test due to the lag on the series.40 For each control group, we select the top 
20 institutions in terms of capitalization from STOXX® Euro 600 Banks, STOXX® Euro 
600 Insurance and STOXX® Europe 600 for banks, insurers and non-financials 
respectively.41 
Table 1, displayed in Annex A.3, reports the list of the selected institutions for each 
group. 
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Data were collected both at daily and monthly frequencies. To calculate the ΔCoVaR, 
we rely on a set of state variables as proposed in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), 
namely i) Market volatility (VIX for Europe), ii) Liquidity spread (3M Repo - 3M Bubill), 
iii)} change in the short-term interest rate (3M Bubill), iv) the slope of the yield curve 
(10Y Bund - 3M Bubill), v) credit spread (BAA 5-7Y Corporate (Bank of America) - 
EURO Sovereign 5-7Y (Barclays)), vi) market returns (STOXX EURO 600 All shares). 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. The Granger causality test (Billio et al., 2012) 
  
(a) Full insurance group (b) Insurance group split into SIFI and Non-SIFI 
 
Figure 1: Total cause connections towards total system. 
The figure displays for each group the number of significant cause and receives linear Granger 
causality connections over the total number of possible cause and receive connections. The statistical 
significance level is set at 5%. Results are calculated using Newey West standard errors. 
 
Figure 5.1a above reports the evolution over time of the total number of causing 
(Granger-causal) significant connections over the total number of possible connections 
from each group towards the total system. 
During the pre-crisis period the measure reports a generalized decrease in the 
connectivity level across the three groups: particularly in the period from 1999 to the 
end of 2004, the level of connectivity goes from roughly 20%-25% to 10%-15%. 
Starting form 2005 the graph shows a general increase of the significant connections 
that move to average values of 20%-25% with peaks of 35% in the beginning of 2007 
and 2012. Looking at the single curves it is worth noting how during tranquil periods, 
namely in a low level relevant connection environment, the non-financial sector tends 
to play a more active role in comparison to the financial sector. The opposite occurs 
when the financial crises approach: financial companies almost doubled the number of 
relevant causing connection. As a matter of fact, starting from 2008 when Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy and American International Group (AIG) was bailed out, 
the index signals a small increase for non-financial and a jump in the connectivity 
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level for the financial service industry. This is evidence that these two events 
represent more of a shock to the financial industry than to the non-financial industry. 
Among the financial sector insurers display always a lower level of connectivity with 
respect to banks. 
Figure 5.1b above reports the average results for those insurers labelled as SIFIs: this 
distinction is particularly relevant since regulators indicated some common 
characteristics among these institutions which should make them more systemically 
relevant compared to the median insurer. Results show a higher average degree of 
causality compared to the non-SIFI group with observable significant peaks during the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and AIG bailout. In general, we can see that despite a 
higher causality compared to non-SIFIs, this sub-group of institutions still tends to 
play a minor role compared to banks in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis. 
In summary, the outcome provided by the Granger causality test gives a fairly clear 
picture over time of who causes systemic risk: non-financials behave as a source of 
systemic risk during tranquil periods, whereas banks appear to be the most prominent 
cause in the aftermath of the crises. In particular, among financial institutions, 
insurers display an ambiguous behaviour and on average play a subordinated role 
compared to banks, especially during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and its aftermath. 
This is in line with existing findings for American insurance companies.42 Findings 
apply both to non-SIFI and SIFI insurers, with the SIFI insurers reporting higher 
degree of causality than non-SIFI insurers, but on average lower than banks. 
5.2. ΔCoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) 
  
(a)Full insurance group. (b) Insurance group split into SIFI and Non-SIFI. 
 
Figure 2: Average institutions' ΔCoVaR towards total system. 
The figures display the industry monthly average calculated on single institution's median value. 
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Figure 5.2a reports the results of the average individual institutions' ΔCoVaR towards 
the total system. The figure displays slight differentiation between financial and non-
financial institutions with the curves almost perfectly co-moving up to mid-2007. From 
2007 onwards the curves start to diverge: after the crises, the contribution to 
systemic risk of financial institutions increases dramatically, with banks once again 
dominating insurers in terms of marginal contribution. Even though the differences 
appear modest, we should stress the fact that the measure is estimated on daily 
returns and averaged through many institutions. Therefore the average marginal 
contribution of banks after 2008 can be estimated as being roughly 20% higher 
compared to insurers, which leaves it significantly higher. 
Figure 5.2b reports a widespread increase of systemic contribution of SIFI insurers 
measured by CoVaR in comparison to the non-SIFI sample and even compared to 
banks. As a matter of fact, before the crisis SIFIs could be identified as the most 
systemically relevant institutions, whereas in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis their 
level of systemic relevance substantially matches the level displayed for banks. 
In summary, ΔCoVaR provides a fairly clear indication of the behaviour of financial 
and non-financial institutions, which is in line with the Granger causality test. Besides, 
once more, insurers tend to play a subordinated role compared to banks, with the 
exception of a SIFIs’ subsample that reports a high degree of systemic relevance, i.e. 
being highest in tranquil periods and providing almost the same contribution as banks 
during crises. 
5.3. DMES (Brownlees and Engle, 2012 
  
(a)Full insurance group. (b) Insurance group split into SIFI and Non-SIFI. 
 
Figure 3: Average institutions' DMES towards total system. 
The figures display the industry monthly average calculated on single institution's median value. 
 
Figure 5.3a reports the results for the average marginal contribution of the individual 
institution towards the whole system. The pattern of each group is comparable with 
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the one obtained with the other two measures, in particular with the ΔCoVaR. The two 
measures present the same peaks during the financial crises and report a higher level 
of systemic riskiness after the crises compared to the pre-crises period. Differences 
from the previous measures can be found in the spikes at the end of 2001 and 2003 
reported by DMES: these spikes are mainly driven by the insurance industry and can 
be traced back to industry-specific events such as 9/11 and severe natural 
catastrophes occurring in Europe in 2003. Consistent with the design of the measure, 
these peaks are well captured by DMES due to its focus on the tail of the distribution, 
i.e. severe events. In general, financial institutions report lower average DMES values 
than non-financial institutions, with some differences between banks and insurers 
depending on the period: in the aftermath of the crises, banks pose more risk than 
insurers. 
Figure 5.3b reports the result for the DMES highlighting the behaviour of SIFIs: 
among the three measures, the DMES displays the smallest differences between SIFI 
and non-SIFI insurers. Moreover, in the period following the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy the systemic contribution of SIFI insurers remain inferior to the 
contribution of banks. Such an outcome stems from the high weight attributed by the 
measure to extreme events that affect the whole insurance industry's companies 
independently by being or not SIFIs. In summary, the DMES confirms the results 
obtained from the other two measures, attributing a higher systemic relevance to 
financial institutions, among which insurers prevail before Lehman Brothers and banks 
in its aftermath. Insurers display a higher systemic relevance than banks only for 
specific severe events properly captured by the measure. The measure, due to its 
construction, does not distinguish between SIFI and non-SIFI insurers over the 
observed time frame. 
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5.4. Industry Composition Index 
 
Figure 4: Cumulative index. 
The graph reports the average industry composition of the 3 indices at each point in time. 
In order to provide a straightforward representation of the systemic relevance of the 
three groups according to the three measures, we display in Figure 5.4 the ten most 
systemically relevant institutions grouped by industry at each point in time. The 
systemic relevance of the three groups is summarized into a synthetic indicator that 
displays at each point in time the industry composition of the top ten most systemic 
institutions.43 
The index clearly shows the alternative role of banks and non-financial companies 
over the observed period with non-financials dominating the index before Lehman, 
whereas banks dominate it thereafter. Insurers always tend to play a subordinated 
role both before and after the Lehman bankruptcy with respect to non-financial and to 
banks. However, it is worth noting that insurers are persistently present among the 
top ten systemic relevant institutions all over the observed period: if banks tend to 
replace non-financial institutions in the aftermath of the crises the number of 
insurance companies remains almost constant. Moreover, the progressive 
disappearing of non-financial companies from the top ten in the aftermath of the crisis 
and the European sovereign debt crisis that followed, allows appreciating the financial 
nature of these crises. 
Concluding, we can summarize our findings: i) the three measures make a clear 
distinction between financial and non-financial institutions; ii) among financial 
institutions, banks dominate insurers in terms of contribution to systemic risk in the 
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aftermath of the crises, with insurers still displaying a persistent contribution to 
systemic risk over time; iii) there is no clear-cut evidence on higher systemic 
relevance of SIFI insurers; iv) trends in systemic risk contributions are time-
dependent and tend to change rapidly, making the choice of the time span of analysis 
a crucial variable. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the three measures were 
developed to capture different features of the systemic risk contribution of 
institutions, therefore inconsistencies over time should not be seen as lack of 
accuracy, but rather as emphasis on different factors that contribute to systemic risk. 
6. Conclusion 
In the present work, we propose an analysis of the role of the insurance industry in 
posing systemic risk. We conduct an aggregated industry analysis based on three 
measures of systemic risk on three different groups, Banks, non-financials and 
insurers operating in the European market. By doing so, we aim to test the relative 
systemic risk contribution of the insurance industry vis-á-vis other industries. 
Our evidence suggests that financial institutions tend to cause more systemic risk 
than non-financial institutions and among financial institutions, banks pose more 
systemic risk than insurers, especially in the aftermath of crises. 
Results are then summarized in the index reporting the top ten institutions by 
systemic relevance over time. The graphs show how the role of financial institution 
became preponderant after the crises and that despite the subordinate role of the 
insurers to banks, insurers are the most persistent companies over the observed 
period. 
In addition we computed the contribution to systemic for the sub-sample of SIFI 
insurers. The Granger based measure and CoVaR distinguish between SIFIs and non-
SIFIs, whereas DMES does not. Therefore our results do not allow inferring clear-cut 
evidence on the higher contribution to systemic risk posed by SIFI compared to non-
SIFI insurers. 
Our results provide a contribution to the debate on the systemic relevance of the 
insurance industry: this is particularly relevant in the light of the ongoing discussion 
on the role of SIFIs and on the specific regulations they might be subjected in the 
future. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Systemic Risk Measures 
The Granger causality test (Billio et al., 2012) 
We measure the systemic importance of an institution in terms of the total number of 
statistically significant pairwise connections based on linear Granger causality tests. 
This approach allows us to infer when equity price movements of an institution 
influence price movements of another institution over a given period of time.  
The Granger causality test measures the ability of two time series to forecast each 
other. We can write the system of equations as follows 
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑖                                                                          (1) 
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑦𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑦𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑗
                                                                         (2) 
in which coefficients 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖𝑗, 𝛼𝑗, 𝛽𝑗𝑖 are estimated via linear regression and in which 
time series 𝑗 is said to “Granger-cause” times series 𝑖 if lagged values of 𝑗 contain 
statistically significant information that helps in predicting 𝑖. 
The causality indicator is defined as follow: 
𝑖 → 𝑗 = { 
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑖
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                    
 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 → 𝑗                        
                                                                 (3) 
Equation three allows us to calculate a series of indexes based on the total number of 
significant relations among institutions at a specific point in time.44 The Degree of 
Granger Causality thus represents the fraction of statistically significant relationships 
over the total number of possible connections among the full sample, 
𝐷𝐺𝐶 =
1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
∑ ∑ (𝑗 → 𝑖)𝑗≠𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                     (4) 
Moreover, we can differentiate between causing and receiving connections which are 
defined as follows: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡: (𝑗 → 𝑆)|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾  
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝑗 → 𝑖)|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑖≠𝑗                                                         (5) 
𝐼𝑛: (𝑆 → 𝑗)|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾  
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝑖 → 𝑗)|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑖≠𝑗                                                           (6) 
We then compute the number of statistically significant in and out connections of one 
institution with respect to the total system: 
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 The level of significance k is set at 0.05. 
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(𝑗 → 𝑆−𝑗)|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾  
1
3𝑁−1
∑ (𝑗 → 𝑆−𝑗)|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑖≠𝑗                                                     (7) 
(𝑆−𝑗 → 𝑗)|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾  
1
3𝑁−1
∑ (𝑆−𝑗 → 𝑗)|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑖≠𝑗                                                     (8) 
The two indexes represent the contribution of each individual institution. We then 
calculate industry averages by summing the total number of institutions' connections 
across each group. 
ΔCoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) 
The measure extends the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) designed for individual 
institutions to the system as a whole. The CoVaR represents the VaR of a system 
conditional on institutions being in distress. The systemic contribution of an individual 
institution to the system is computed as the difference between the CoVaR of the 
institution in distress and the CoVaR in the median state, hence ΔCoVaR. 
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), we calculate the ΔCoVaR using quantile 
regressions by setting the median state at the 50 percentile and the distress situation 
at the 95 percentile. We also include in the regressions a set of 6 state variables 𝑀𝑡−1, 
namely market volatility, liquidity spread, changes in the short-term interest rates, 
the slope of the yield curve, credit spreads and total equity returns, using one week 
lag.  
Estimations are based on the following equations 
𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖                                                                            (9) 
𝑋𝑡
𝑆 = 𝛼𝑆|𝑖𝑦𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑆|𝑖𝑋𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑆|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑆|𝑖
                                                       (10) 
where 𝑖 represents the individual institution and 𝑆 is the index representing the set of 
institutions under consideration. The predicted values from the regressions are then 
plugged into the following equation to obtain both the VaR of the individual institution 
and consequently the CoVaR: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) = ?̂?𝑞
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑞
𝑖𝑀𝑡−1                                                                            (11) 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) = ?̂?𝑆|𝑖𝑦𝑡
𝑗 + ?̂?𝑆|𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) + 𝛾𝑆|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1                                                 (12) 
Finally, the contribution of each institution to the system is calculated as follows: 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(5%) − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(50%) = ?̂?𝑆|𝑖(𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(5%) − 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(50%))          (13) 
The total system is defined as follow: 
𝑋𝑡
𝑆 =
∑ 𝜔𝑡−1
𝑗
𝑟𝑡
𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
∑ 𝜔𝑡−1
𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
                                                                                        (14) 
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with ω =market capitalization, r= return, j= total system, 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
=
1
𝑁
∑ Ф−1(0.5)𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡→𝑡+ℎ
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑁
𝑖                                      (15) 
where 𝑡 → 𝑡 + ℎ indicates 1 calendar month of daily ΔCoVaR and 𝑁 represents the 
number of institutions for each of the 3 groups. In order to avoid correlation biases we 
exclude institution 𝑖 from the index representing the reference group. 
DMES (Brownlees and Engle, 2012) 
The measure is based on the expected loss conditional to a distressed situation (e.g. 
returns being less than a certain quantile): Brownlees and Engle (2012) extend the 
measure proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) by introducing a dynamic model 
characterized by time varying volatility and correlation as well as nonlinear tail 
dependence. The market model is defined as follows 
𝑟𝑚𝑡 = 𝜎𝑚𝑡𝜖𝑚𝑡                                                                                               . 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜎𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑡𝜖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖𝑡√1− 𝜌𝑖𝑡
2 𝜉𝑖𝑡                                                                     (16) 
(𝜖𝑚𝑡, 𝜉𝑚𝑡)~𝐹                                                                                                . 
where 𝑟𝑖 is the market return of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ institution and 𝜎𝑖𝑡 is its conditional standard 
deviation, 𝑟𝑚 is the market return of the system considered and 𝜎𝑚𝑡  is its conditional 
standard deviation, 𝜖 and 𝜉 are the shocks that drive the system and 𝜌𝑖𝑡 is the 
conditional correlation between 𝑖 and 𝑚. 
The one period ahead DMES can be expressed as follows 
𝐷𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
1 (𝐶) =  𝜎𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑡−1 (𝜖𝑚𝑡|𝜖𝑚𝑡 <
𝐶
𝜎𝑚𝑡
) + 𝜎𝑖𝑡√1− 𝜌𝑖𝑡
2𝐸𝑡−1(𝜉𝑖𝑡|𝜖𝑚𝑡 <
𝐶
𝜎𝑚𝑡
)             (17) 
where 𝐶 is the conditioning systemic event which we assume to be equal to the 95th 
percentile of the total period market return, i.e. 𝐶 = Ф−1(0.95)𝑟𝑚.
45 The conditional 
standard deviations and the conditional correlation are estimated by means of a 
TARCH and a DCC model respectively.46 The tail expectations 𝐸𝑡−1 (𝜖𝑚𝑡|𝜖𝑚𝑡 <
𝐶
𝜎𝑚𝑡
) and 
𝐸𝑡−1 (𝜉𝑚𝑡|𝜖𝑚𝑡 <
𝐶
𝜎𝑚𝑡
) are calculated by means of a non-parametric kernel estimator and 
are given by the following equations: 
                                       
45
 The choice over the 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.95 of the market allows for a more direct comparison with the estimations of the ΔCoVa For 
further mathematical details, see Brownlees and Engle, 2012.R. 
46
 For further mathematical details, see Brownlees and Engle, 2012. 
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?̂?ℎ(𝜖𝑚𝑡|𝜖𝑚𝑡 < 𝑘) =
∑ 𝜖𝑚𝑡𝐾ℎ(𝜖𝑚𝑡−𝑘)
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑛𝑝ℎ)
                                                                 (18) 
?̂?ℎ(𝜉𝑚𝑡|𝜖𝑚𝑡 < 𝑘) =
∑ 𝜉𝑚𝑡𝐾ℎ(𝜖𝑚𝑡−𝑘)
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑛𝑝ℎ)
                                                                  (19) 
?̂?ℎ =
∑ 𝐾ℎ(𝜖𝑚𝑡−𝑘)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
                                                                                            . 
The total system is defined as follow: 
𝑟𝑚𝑡 =
∑ 𝜔𝑡−1
𝑗
𝑟𝑡
𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
∑ 𝜔𝑡−1
𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
                                                                                           (20) 
with ω=market capitalization, r= return, j= total system, 
𝐷𝑀𝐸𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
=
1
𝑁
∑ Ф−1(0.5)𝐷𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑡→𝑡+ℎ
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑁
𝑖                                              (21) 
where 𝑡 → 𝑡 + ℎ indicates 1 calendar month of daily DMES and 𝑁 represents the 
number of institutions for each of the 3 groups. In order to avoid correlation biases we 
exclude institution 𝑖 from the index representing the reference group.  
A.2 Industry Composition Index 
The group of selected institutions at each point in time is defined as  
𝑆𝑡
𝑘 = {𝑖1,𝑡 > ⋯ > 𝑖𝑛,𝑡 > ⋯ > 𝑖10,𝑡}                                                                      (22) 
in which 𝑖𝑛 represents an institution ranked from the most to the least systemic (with 
𝑛 = 1 → 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐)  according to the 𝑘 measure, with 𝑘 = Granger, ΔCoVaR, DMES. 
Then, the index for each systemic risk measure 𝑘 is obtained as follows 
𝐼𝑡
𝑘 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
∑ ℾ𝑖𝑛,𝑡=𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘
10
𝑛=1
10
                 
∑ ℾ𝑖𝑛,𝑡=𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟
10
𝑛=1
10
            
 
∑ ℾ𝑖𝑛,𝑡=𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙
10
𝑛=1
10
 
                                                                             (23) 
in which ℾ is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition (e.g. if 𝑖𝑛 = 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘) 
is met and 0 otherwise. Sums are then scaled between 0 and 1. 
Finally, we group all three indexes and form the total index, which is given by  
𝐼𝑡
𝑘 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
∑ ∑ ℾ𝑖𝑛,𝑘,𝑡=𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘
10
𝑛=1𝑘
10
                 
∑ ∑ ℾ𝑖𝑛,𝑘,𝑡=𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟
10
𝑛=1𝑘
10
            
 
∑ ∑ ℾ𝑖𝑛,𝑘,𝑡=𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙
10
𝑛=1𝑘
10
 
                                                                     (24) 
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A.3 Tables 
Table 1: List of the institutions included in the three control groups. 
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